By Majid Ghorbani

The 2026 BRICS Summit in New Delhi was about more than diplomatic symbolism. With Chinese President Xi Jinping making his first visit to India since 2019 and meeting Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the summit offered an important signal about the direction of China–India relations—and, by extension, the possibilities and limits of cooperation within an increasingly diverse BRICS.

The bigger question is whether BRICS can translate its growing geopolitical weight into practical economic cooperation. As its membership expands and its economies become more interconnected, the value of the grouping will depend less on grand declarations than on its ability to facilitate trade, strengthen energy cooperation, diversify financial channels and create new opportunities for businesses across member countries.

Here, CEIBS Associate Professor of Management Practice and Deputy Director of Global MiM CEIBS (Switzerland)-ESCP Double Degree Programme Majid Ghorbani looks beyond the headlines to examine the evolving China-India relationship and what a more pragmatic model of BRICS cooperation could look like.

The 18th BRICS summit, held in New Delhi on September 12–13 under India’s chairmanship, generated expectations that were probably too high. Many observers hoped that the meeting would produce a breakthrough in India–China relations, a major agreement on energy and sustainability, a clear roadmap for de-dollarisation, and a stronger framework for expanding trade among BRICS members.

The results were more modest. The summit did not resolve the most difficult disputes among its members, but it maintained dialogue, established areas for future cooperation and demonstrated that BRICS is evolving from a symbolic grouping into a more complicated, diverse and sometimes contradictory institution.

The key takeaway is that BRICS cannot advance through political declarations alone. Its future will depend on whether governments and businesses can build practical cooperation in trade, manufacturing, technology, energy and finance while protecting their own national interests. 

The New Delhi Declaration, adopted by consensus at this latest summit, covered global governance, trade and finance, energy and climate policy, technology, health, agriculture and people-to-people exchanges. It also reaffirmed the three traditional pillars of BRICS cooperation: political and security coordination, economic and financial cooperation, and cultural and social exchanges. 

For businesses in China and around the world, these are not abstract geopolitical questions. They increasingly shape the markets companies can enter, the partners they can work with, the supply chains they can build and the financial systems they use for cross-border trade.

India and China: Stabilisation before transformation

The India–China relationship was one of the most closely watched aspects of the summit. China reportedly brought an exceptionally large delegation, reflecting the importance Beijing attaches both to BRICS and to its relationship with India. The two countries had strong reasons to use the occasion for dialogue. Both are major BRICS members, both are leading developing economies, and both want the organisation to become more influential in global affairs.

At the same time, their relationship remains burdened by an unresolved border dispute, strategic mistrust and economic imbalances. A summit alone cannot eliminate those problems in one meeting.

The more realistic achievement was continued progress towards better border management and preventing further escalation. India and China did not reach a final settlement of their boundary dispute or transform their relationship into a strategic partnership, but they continued to create conditions for future negotiations.

That is important because the border issue affects almost every other area of bilateral relations. When the military relationship deteriorates, economic cooperation becomes more difficult. Investment is subjected to greater scrutiny, technology partnerships become politically sensitive, and public opinion becomes less receptive to compromise. Conversely, even limited progress on border stability can create space for cooperation in trade, investment, transport, climate technology and multilateral diplomacy.

For companies, greater political stability can reduce uncertainty around investment, supplier relationships, market access and technology partnerships.

The principle is straightforward: India and China do not need to resolve every disagreement before they begin cooperating. But they do need sufficient trust to ensure that cooperation in one area is not immediately destroyed by a crisis in another.

The first priority should therefore be stabilisation. Regular military communication, respect for existing agreements, improved patrol-management mechanisms and political-level dialogue are not spectacular achievements, but they are essential ones.

Trade: From Market Opening to Joint Production

BRICS members want to expand trade with one another, but they do not all mean the same thing by “greater trade.”

China and India, as two of the grouping’s most advanced manufacturing economies, would naturally like other BRICS countries to open their markets to their products, machinery, infrastructure companies, agricultural goods, vehicles and technology. Chinese and Indian companies have the scale and productive capacity to compete effectively in many markets.

However, other BRICS members also want to protect their own industries. Brazil, South Africa, Russia, Indonesia, Iran and other members have national firms, domestic employment concerns and strategic sectors that they do not want to expose suddenly to more advanced or lower-cost foreign competitors.

This makes a broad, immediate market-opening agreement unlikely. Governments will continue to defend sensitive industries, agriculture, infrastructure and technology.

The answer may lie in changing the model of cooperation. BRICS members should think less in terms of one country’s companies entering another country to dominate its market, and more in terms of companies building capacity together. For business leaders, this distinction is important. Market entry does not necessarily have to mean exporting from the home country; it can also mean investing locally, forming joint ventures, developing suppliers and adapting products to local markets.

Smaller firms could be particularly important. Large state-owned or multinational corporations often arrive with the objective of securing market share, controlling supply chains or establishing a dominant position. Smaller companies may be more willing to form partnerships, share expertise, localise production and adapt to the needs of the host country. This could create opportunities not only for large multinationals, but also for the small and medium-sized companies that often provide specialised technologies, components and services within larger supply chains.

An Indian engineering firm could partner with a Brazilian manufacturer; a Chinese solar company could establish a joint venture in Africa; and Russian, Iranian or Indonesian firms could contribute specialised expertise in energy, transport, mining or logistics.

The goal would not be for foreign firms simply to sell into local markets. It would be to build products, services and supply chains together.

This model would not eliminate disagreements over intellectual property, technology transfer or national security. But shared value creation can make cooperation more sustainable than simple export relationships.

European economic cooperation provides a broad historical lesson. Countries that had previously competed intensely gradually developed industrial, financial and institutional ties. They did not eliminate national interests, but they created enough mutual dependence to make cooperation more attractive than permanent confrontation.

BRICS cannot simply copy the European experience. Its members are more diverse, its political systems are less integrated and its economic differences are enormous. Still, it can learn from the principle that economic integration often begins with practical relationships among firms, universities, investors and local communities rather than with grand political declarations.

Energy: Agreement on transition, disagreement on speed

BRICS members broadly supported cleaner technology and a greener energy future. However, the summit did not produce a decisive agreement to phase out oil, gas or coal. That outcome was predictable.

The BRICS grouping includes major energy importers, major fossil-fuel exporters and countries at very different stages of economic development. China and India are among the world’s largest energy consumers. Russia, Iran and several other members depend heavily on hydrocarbon exports, while other members need affordable energy to industrialise, expand electricity access and improve living standards.

For those reasons, the New Delhi Declaration emphasised energy security and a fair, orderly and inclusive transition rather than a rapid and uniform reduction in fossil-fuel consumption. The declaration supported climate cooperation and implementation of the Paris Agreement, while also recognising the continuing importance of oil and gas for developing economies.

This position is understandable. Countries still trying to provide reliable electricity, transport and industrial capacity will find it difficult to accept energy policies designed primarily for wealthy economies. Affordable fossil fuels can help a developing country expand manufacturing, build infrastructure and reduce poverty.

Nevertheless, the summit may have missed an important opportunity. Developing countries do not necessarily have to choose between economic growth and renewable energy. China and India possess significant manufacturing capabilities in solar panels, batteries, electric vehicles, electrical equipment and other clean technologies, which could help developing countries build renewable-energy systems without reproducing the fossil-fuel-intensive development path followed by earlier industrial powers.

This would require more than selling finished products. It would involve financing, training, maintenance, technology partnerships, local assembly and the development of domestic supply chains. For companies, this represents a shift from an export model towards longer-term participation in local markets. The commercial opportunity may lie not only in selling equipment, but in financing projects, providing services, training workers and helping to build local industrial capabilities.

BRICS could therefore build a practical clean-energy partnership around shared production rather than simply shared declarations. Its members could cooperate on solar manufacturing, battery storage, grid management, electric public transportation, agricultural technology and green hydrogen. Such cooperation would also allow China and India to use their industrial capabilities in ways that generate political goodwill rather than suspicion.

China’s electric-vehicle industry offers one example of how investment, infrastructure, supply chains and manufacturing scale can accelerate technological adoption. Other developing countries may not reproduce China’s model, but they can learn from its combination of industrial policy, investment and technological adaptation.

The question is not whether every BRICS member should abandon fossil fuels immediately. The more constructive question is whether BRICS can help countries reduce their dependence before that dependence becomes entrenched.

The limits of de-dollarisation

De-dollarisation was another area in which expectations exceeded likely results. BRICS members have strong reasons to reduce their exposure to dollar-based payment systems. Sanctions, geopolitical tensions and concerns about the concentration of financial power have encouraged them to explore trade in national currencies and alternative payment mechanisms.

But replacing the dollar is far more difficult than criticising it.

A successful international currency requires more than a large economy. It needs deep financial markets, predictable monetary policy, legal confidence, convertibility, liquidity and broad acceptance by businesses and central banks. No single BRICS currency currently meets all of those requirements.

BRICS currencies face different constraints. The renminbi has greater international use but remains subject to capital controls; the rupee also faces limitations as an international settlement currency; and several other BRICS currencies are more volatile. The UAE dirham is closely pegged to the dollar, limiting the extent to which it represents an alternative to the dollar-centred system.

Bilateral trade conducted in the currency of one of the two trading partners can also create difficulties when there is a persistent imbalance between them. If one country continually exports more than it imports, the other may accumulate large amounts of a currency that it cannot easily spend or convert. This can make national-currency settlement unattractive, even when both governments support it politically.

One possible solution would be a basket of BRICS currencies rather than a single national currency. Such a system could distribute exchange-rate risk and give countries greater flexibility in settling trade, but it would require agreement on the basket's composition, management and convertibility. Its success would ultimately depend on economic stability, institutional credibility and the willingness of businesses to use it.

A more realistic path is therefore gradual de-dollarisation through bilateral arrangements, regional payment systems and, eventually, a possible currency basket. This would create additional options rather than eliminate the dollar. For businesses, the practical question is whether companies will have a wider range of reliable and affordable ways to price, settle and hedge cross-border transactions.

The immediate objective should not be to create a single currency that replaces the dollar, but to reduce the cost and vulnerability of trade conducted through one dominant financial system. A more diversified monetary system is therefore more plausible than a completely post-dollar system.

De-risking without isolation

Many BRICS members are pursuing de-risking. India wants to reduce excessive dependence on China. China wants to protect itself against Western technology restrictions. Other members want to avoid overdependence on any single major power.

De-risking is not inherently negative. Every country should diversify its supply chains and protect critical infrastructure. The danger arises when de-risking becomes a justification for economic isolation.

The better approach is managed interdependence. Countries can protect sensitive sectors while still expanding cooperation in areas where mutual benefit is clear. Firms can diversify suppliers without abandoning profitable partnerships. Governments can create rules that distinguish between legitimate national-security concerns and protectionism disguised as security policy.

This process will take time because trust cannot be created by declarations. It is built through repeated transactions, reliable contracts, transparent partnerships and successful cooperation.

The future of BRICS will therefore depend less on whether its leaders announce a revolutionary new currency or a sweeping free-trade agreement. It will depend on whether the members can turn political contact into practical collaboration.

The New Delhi summit did not deliver the transformation many expected. It did, however, preserve the possibility of one. India and China continued to manage their differences rather than allowing them to destroy the relationship. BRICS members endorsed cleaner technologies without pretending that their economic circumstances were identical. They explored alternatives to dollar dependence without claiming that a replacement currency is imminent. And they continued to discuss trade while confronting the reality that national protection will remain powerful.

The next stage should be built from the bottom up. Smaller firms, research institutions, investors and local governments should be encouraged to form partnerships across BRICS countries. For businesses, the opportunity will lie not simply in selling into BRICS markets, but in building partnerships, localising production, diversifying supply chains and developing technologies that respond to different member economies. If these relationships succeed, they can gradually create the trust required for larger agreements.

BRICS will not become influential by declaring that it is a new global order. It will become influential if its members can demonstrate that cooperation among diverse developing economies can deliver tangible gains in energy access, industrial growth, technological progress and financial resilience. That is a slower process—but it is also a more credible one.

Majid Ghorbani is an Associate Professor of Management Practice and Deputy Director of Global MiM CEIBS (Switzerland)-ESCP Double Degree Programme at CEIBS. His research interests mostly focus on the influence of government, policy and political systems on corporate social responsibility, and innovation and entrepreneurship strategies.