Favoritism in Regulation: Evidence from Revolving-doors in Patent Examination
Abstract:
We examine whether prior employment relationships create firm-specific advantages in the allocation of patent rights. Linking the career histories of U.S. patent examiners to corporate patent applications filed between 2000 and 2019, we find that examiners are more likely to approve applications submitted by their former employers. An approval advantage also appears when these firms’ applications are reviewed by other examiners in the same art unit, suggesting that the influence of employment ties extends beyond the directly connected official. Patents granted under these connections receive fewer subsequent citations, have lower market-based values, and exhibit weaker disclosure characteristics. Firms also increase their patent filings in art units after former employees join those units, consistent with a strategic response to regulatory connections. Finally, greater examiner leniency toward former employers is associated with more patent-representation business from those employers at the law firms the examiners subsequently join. This evidence is consistent with a career-benefit channel, although it does not establish reciprocal exchange. Together, our findings link prior employment networks to favorable regulatory treatment, firms’ patenting behavior, and the commercial value of professional relationships after public service.
Contact Emails:
zlynne@ceibs.edu