Abstract:
Blockchain governance and consensus mechanisms commonly rely on token-weighted voting, where voting power can be concentrated, voters behave strategically, and payoffs are token-denominated. We distinguish asymptotic aggregation, the existence of strategy profiles that implement the realized state with probability converging to one, from asymptotic implementation, which requires such profiles to be Bayes–Nash equilibria. We show that, for every admissible information structure, balance—a property of voting weights whereby there exist coalitions whose aggregate weight approaches one half—is necessary for asymptotic aggregation. Under weak additional conditions on voting weights, balance is also sufficient for asymptotic robust aggregation, i.e., asymptotic aggregation for every admissible information structure. For such balanced weight distributions, we characterize a property of the payment token under which constant-payment mechanisms, which are common in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), satisfy asymptotic robust implementation. By contrast, every majority-incentive mechanism, which directly rewards agreement with the implemented outcome, fails asymptotic robust implementation, regardless of the voting weight distribution or payment token type. Such majority-incentive mechanisms are common in oracle and blockchain consensus mechanisms.
Contact Emails:
scoco@ceibs.edu