Why History Matters

It is a great honor and pleasure for me to speak to you today in the Daxia Forum Lecture. Thanks to ECNU officials, who have invited me, to Dean Feng Shaolei, a friend and colleague of many years, and to my colleagues in the School of Advanced International and Area Studies. Welcome too to distinguished visitors and friends. May I also extend a special thanks to the students in my course on Europe and the World: Past, Present and Future. A big subject, but I have to tell you that I have learned as much from them as I hope they have learned from me. In the best tradition of Confucius, I believe that teaching should be an interaction between teacher and students. In the past, I have—like all teachers—had favorite students. Two of my favorite students were Dean Feng Shaolei and Professor Xiang Lanxin. Now my two favorite students have become my two favorite teachers, who help me to understand China.

For almost 30 years, I have combined two careers -- as an academic and a U.S State Department official. In both careers I have sought to blend analysis of current events with a strong sense of history. People sometimes ask me, how can you do this? How can you have two careers and such different careers? I answer that I am an amphibian: I swim in academic water and walk on the hard land of policy. I will speak today as an academic. Inevitably though, one career affects my thinking in the other.

The students in my ECNU class know that I believe there are four “pillars” of international studies: history, economics, culture, and politics. I will speak mostly today about history. But as you will quickly see, history has a way of becoming contemporary politics. I will begin by talking about how to think historically and then discuss classical theories of international relations. Finally, I will examine three historical case studies, which I hope will provide some useful lessons for contemporary issues and also lead to a lively discussion.

Now thinking historically is not necessarily easy. But thinking historically, I believe, is essential for anyone who is interested in contemporary affairs. History isn’t just something that happened a long time ago. Some of us can remember history in our lifetimes. History has a funny way of coming along with us and so I think it is important to remember that history is a living process. It connects the past, the present and the future. History does not repeat itself exactly, but certain issues keep coming back over and over again. I once posed a question to an older, favorite aunt who was 80 years old at that point. “Aunt Barbara,” I asked, “does it get easier when you get older?” And she looked at me like the kid I was and said, “No dearie, you just recognize things faster -- because you have seen it all before.” And I think history is certainly like that. You get to recognize certain issues and certain patterns that occur over and over again. History is also a rich source of lessons. As the Hispanic-American philosopher, George Santayana warned, “Those who ignore history are condemned to repeat it.”

And finally, thinking historically means coming to terms with the past. There is a negative and a positive sense in which I mean, “coming to terms with the past.” The negative sense is an honest recognition of one’s mistakes. I believe in modern history Germany provides a good example of a country that has come to terms with its past or perhaps I should use the progressive form of that verb, “coming” to terms with the past, because it is a continuing process. Japan I think is a much less successful example, because it is a country that has not yet fully come to terms with its past. Every country in the world, every person, has a past that one must be honest about. But there is also a positive sense in coming to terms with the past. We all need to recognize and take pride in our own traditions and of our own historical experiences. China, for example, has great traditions stretching back more than four thousand years. So, coming to terms with the past also means remembering the past.

Speaking of traditions, when we try to understand contemporary events, we often use classical theories of international relations. Many of you have taken courses on international relations theory. Some of you might think they are boring. Some of you might think they are too abstract. But they help us organize the “facts” of history. They also help us make sense of contemporary international politics. So I want to begin by talking briefly about those classical theories.

Let me start by stating the large theme of this lecture. That is, there has been a constant interaction for at least two millennia between what we usually call “the East” and “the West.” The idea that the East and the West have separate and distinct histories is, I believe, a myth. I think, in fact, we can see that the Silk Road carried more than goods -- it carried ideas. For the first millennium of the relationship, particularly between around 500 and 1800 of the Common Era, China was the originator of many new ideas and inventions and was the great innovator of the world. The West took these ideas and adapted them to its own circumstances. As a result, the East contributed greatly to European development after 1800. The Middle East in many respects was the bridge between China and the West historically, especially Iran and Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. This applies, above all, to Iran, because ideas and goods could move north and south from Iran to the Silk Road just as ideas and goods could move east and west along the Silk Road. So, in many respects ancient Persia was the mediator between China and the Western world.

But before concluding with this theme, I should tell you that the view I have just presented is a little provocative. There is currently a great debate in the West about the origins of our civilization. Increasingly, scholars in Western Europe are becoming aware that China played a key role in European development. But this has not always been the case. The old view was that Europe developed autonomously, without any help from other areas of the world. As Rudyard Kipling, the poet laureate of the British Empire, famously said, “Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain (two) shall meet.” The modern version of this thesis is Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, which posits an antagonistic relationship between Western and Eastern civilizations. I think these are the ugly weeds in the garden. They must be pulled out by the roots and thrown away. Without revising this erroneous idea of the separate development of Eastern and Western civilization, we will not understand the profound impact the frequent encounters of East and West have had on each others’ development all along.[1]

There are two broad schools of the classical European tradition in international relations. One school is usually referred to as the Realist school, the other the Liberal school. The Realist school grew up in the 17^th century to help explain warring European states. One of the great theorists and practitioners of this school was Cardinal Richelieu, who was the advisor to the French king Louis XIII. He advocated a policy of Raison d’Etat, or a rational and calm pursuit of national interests. He favored a self-conscious policy of maintaining the European balance of power, even if this meant ignoring religious and ideological differences. So, he allied France with Protestant German princes and Sweden against his fellow Catholics in the Hapsburg Empire during the 30 years war (1618-1648) in order to maintain the European equilibrium and protect French independence.

From Richelieu’s era down to 1945, there was a pattern, or cycle – to use a Chinese expression – of international relations in Europe. This was a series of attempts to unify Europe by a single hegemonic power and countervailing efforts to form coalitions in order to protect the independence of the smaller states. First Austria, then France, and twice Germany, tried to unify Europe by establishing control over the continent. And on each occasion, coalitions of independent states formed to resist the power seeking to centralize Europe. This historical cycle of attempts at hegemony and the reestablishment of equilibrium provides the background to modern European views on the world. [2]

The Liberal school of international relations comes from the 18^th century enlightenment. And the great master of this tradition was the German philosopher Emmanuel Kant. Kant, whose essay on “Perpetual Peace,” described his vision of a harmonious world, free of conflict and based on independent republics. For modern followers of Kant, liberal democracies are naturally peaceful but are threatened by non-democratic countries, especially those equipped with weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the Liberal view of international relations holds that peace is threatened by illiberal economic policies such as protectionism, exchange controls and excessive regulations. A representative example of the Liberal school of international relations was the American President, Woodrow Wilson.

Europe and the US share this Western classical tradition but interpret it in very different ways. This is because Europe and the US have very different historical experiences. For many in Western Europe, equilibrium and the balance of power are the natural and preferred state of international affairs. This is, after all, their experience of four centuries. When the French speak today of multipolarity, they refer back to this European tradition of the balance of power. They regard unipolar systems as inherently unstable and dangerous. For the Americans, on the other hand, the balance of power is unstable and leads to war. A chaotic world, most American policy experts believe, requires a strong leader and, happily, the US is in the best position to provide this leadership. So the US interprets European support for a multipolar system as anti-American and appeals to Europeans to follow the American lead in world affairs. This is the chief source of difficulty in trans-Atlantic relations. It arises from different historical experiences, in which the American and European ideas on international relations are deeply rooted.

China, like Europe, has had its own international system, with a long experience of several thousand years of international relations, for the most part within China. As a consequence, China has developed its own classical theories. I have been reading a marvelous example of this classical theory. Please forgive me for my poor Chinese pronunciation, but I will try to do my best. This is the classical novel Sén Guó Yăn Yì or The Romance of the Three Kingdoms. There is a wonderful first line of the novel, which I will try and read to you. Again, please forgive me for mangling the beautiful Chinese language: Fēn Jĭo Bì Hé; Hé Jĭo Bì Fēn or The kingdom long divided, must unite; long united, must divide. This is an important statement of the Chinese view of history. It reflects the Chinese historical experience, just as the balance of power reflects the European historical experience. In addition, this classical Chinese novel provides much wisdom on the dynamics of triangular relations among great powers. I think we can learn a great deal from studying each others’ traditions.

One problem with all theories of international relations is that they tend to be abstract and can become intellectual castles in the sky: beautiful to look at but difficult to grasp. To be useful, international relations theory must be closely related to history and political reality. Two of my favorite examples of successful use of history and international politics are Paul Kennedy and Henry Kissinger. Kennedy examines the problem of “imperial overstretch” in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, focusing on the histories of Spain, Austria, France, Britain and Germany. In the final, controversial chapter, he speculates on America’s overstretch. Kissinger’s superb book on Diplomacy combines the insights of an experienced diplomat with those of the professional historian. He concludes with an interesting discussion on the problems of trying to conduct a realist foreign policy in the context of American idealist political culture.

Now let me turn to history itself and to three historical case studies, which will allow me to discuss the past, the present and the future; and I hope encourage a general discussion of contemporary international issues.

Following the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte, the European Great Powers assembled in Vienna to arrange the peace settlement. At the Congress of Vienna, these Great Powers (Austria, Russia, Britain, Prussia, and defeated France) discovered they had common interests in maintaining the European balance of power and in preserving the legitimacy of established governments. And so, the Great Powers agreed among themselves to meet regularly to try and solve the problems that would inevitably arise from time to time in Europe.

For most of the Nineteenth Century, the Concert of Europe succeeded in maintaining the peace. There were, of course, the wars of independence for Germany and Italy and a small war of great importance in the Crimea between Britain and France on one side and Russia on the other. But the century as a whole was one of the most peaceful in European history. For some historians and commentators on contemporary international relations, there is the hope today that a new concert system can be established on the world stage similar to what Europe had in the past. [3] However, we need to look back at European history and study the problems as well as the successes of the Concert System. In retrospect, we can see that there were three fundamental problems with the Concert of Europe that eventually led to its demise.

The first problem was Britain’s ambivalence toward the Concert System. The British were of two minds whether they wanted to participate actively in continental politics. Sometimes the British participated in the European system; often they did not. This reflected an internal debate in Britain on the degree of their continental commitment. Castlereagh, who had represented Britain at the Congress of Vienna, was a strong supporter of Britain’s involvement in the Concert of Europe. Canning, his successor, was an opponent of an active European role for Britain and preferred a more unilateral and global policy. He believed this would afford Britain a greater freedom of movement and enable the British to preserve the balance of power in Europe without actively engaging in European politics. We can see now that this British ambivalence was one of the fundamental flaws in the Concert system.

The second problem with the Concert of Europe was a consensus among the Great Powers to suppress nationalist and popular movements. These occurred periodically in the Czech lands, Italy, Poland, and Hungary. In Belgium and Greece, the Great Powers did acquiesce for geo-political reasons to nationalist and popular movements and recognized the independence of these two countries. However, for the most part, the response of the Great Powers was to crush such movements, as was done most notably following the revolutions of 1848. In the end, this refusal of the Great Powers to accommodate popular sentiment helped bring about the collapse of the Concert system.

Finally and most importantly the Concert system failed because the Great Powers could not agree on how to manage what was called at the time the “Eastern Question,” which involved arranging an alternative to the collapsing Ottoman Empire. It was disagreement over this issue that led to the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854 and subsequent conflicts in the Balkans and Southeastern Europe.

The hope for a concert of the world today faces almost exactly the same set of challenges that confronted the Concert of Europe nearly two centuries ago. These challenges begin with the ambivalence of the U.S. over whether to participate in a concert of powers. The U.S. today, like Britain in the Nineteenth Century, has trouble making up its mind whether it wants to participate actively in a global concert or pursue a more unilateralist policy, unfettered by multilateral constraints. The debates between old-fashioned realists, like Kissinger, and the more unilateralist neo-conservatives are a close counterpart to the debates between Castlereagh and Canning.

The second challenge confronting a prospective concert of the world is how to respond to the latter day nationalist and populist movements, such as we see in Latin America and the Islamic world today. I think it is becoming increasingly clear that these forces cannot be suppressed. They must be accommodated and hopefully tamed but not crushed. The world is confronted by shortages in sources of energy. It happens that many of these nationalist and populist forces are strongest exactly in those places where important sources of energy are located. So any concert of world powers must be able to adapt to these social and political forces or face a continuing crisis, which could easily upset any hopes for a new, cooperative Great Power system.

But the most difficult challenge confronting a prospective concert system is what we might call the “New Eastern Question,” which includes almost exactly the same region as the old Eastern Question—Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All of these challenges create strong emotions. In this context, we should remember the wise words of a famous diplomat and hero of mine, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand Pericord, who was Foreign Minister of revolutionary France, of Napoleon Bonaparte, and of the restored Bourbon Monarchy. Talleyrand was speaking to a group of young diplomats, a group of young students of international affairs. He cautioned them that they should show “pas trop de zele” (not too much emotion). The problems in the world today are ones we should reflect on without too much emotion. I hope we will see the development of a concert of world powers, but this will require intelligence and patience.[4]

America’s rise occurred almost exactly 100 years ago and provides some interesting parallels with the “peaceful rise” of China today. I know that it is politically correct to refer instead to the “peaceful development” of China, but I rather prefer the original language. It has the virtue of candor.

The world system of a hundred years ago was led by Britain, as it had been for most of the Nineteenth Century. But by the end of the century, new powers were emerging, most notably Germany, the U.S. and Japan. The rise of the U.S. posed both economic and political problems for the established Great Powers. A surge in exports of cheap U.S. agricultural products began to flood into European markets following the American Civil War, which almost immediately created an economic crisis in Europe. Most European countries responded by raising tariffs and imposing a variety of protectionist measures against the products of the new economic power, one of which was the Meline Tariff in France. Significantly, the Meline Tariff provided a model for the later development of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU.

A second point about the rise of the U.S. is that it took more than 50 years and two world wars for the United States to be fully integrated in the international system. For much of this period, American foreign policy vacillated between periods of active involvement in international affairs and retreat into isolationism. American policy statements were often ones of lofty principle without very much practical application.

The world system today is dominated by one power, as it was a century ago. Now this power is the United States, rather than Britain, but the dynamics are similar. And just as one hundred years ago, new powers are emerging—most notably China, India, and Brazil. There is also a surge in exports of cheap Chinese manufactured goods -- the famous issue of shoes and shirts. And like a hundred years ago, protectionist pressures are growing in Europe and the U.S. But the most important question about the comparison is the amount of time it will take for China to be fully integrated in the international system. I don’t think China has the luxury of 50 years -- maybe two weeks, but certainly not 50 years.

We can see today that China is under strong pressure to take clear positions on a number of key international issues. Iran is becoming a test case for China’s world role. Both the United States and Iran seek Chinese support in the debate over Iran’s nuclear program. I do not intend to lecture you on what China’s position should be, but I will say that I do not think the Chinese position on this key issue is very clear. I suspect that China’s position is not clear to the world, because the Chinese leadership has not yet clearly defined its position. Lofty principles too often take the place of practical politics.[5] I think China must define its position more clearly and take a more active role on the critical issue of nuclear proliferation. We the West, we the US, need China to help with the Iran nuclear question.

When the President of Iran comes to Shanghai in two weeks, he will almost certainly remind China’s leaders that Iran has a serious security problem. They are surrounded by countries with nuclear weapons and threatened by the world’s most powerful country. “Why shouldn’t we have nuclear weapons,” he might ask, “ and who are you to tell us that we cannot have nuclear weapons? You already have them and can feel more secure.” What is China’s answer to this question? I think I have an answer, but nobody has asked me.

There is a second issue on which China is already becoming an important international actor and this is as a mediator between developed and developing countries. China is both a developed and a developing country at the same time and is well positioned to serve in this mediating role. This, of course, will not be an easy role to play. There are serious and difficult issues to resolve, as evidenced by the problems that have arisen in the Doha Round of trade talks.

China’s position in the world today is like a sandwich; you are being squeezed from all sides. This is the situation the U.S. faced 100 years ago. The difference is that the world cannot wait 50 years until China decides what it is going to do with its new power. Time moves faster in the 21^st century than it did in the 20^th. One of the most important questions in world politics today is what role China will play in the future? Perhaps the safest answer is the one given by former Premier Zhou Enlai when he was asked by a British diplomat whether he believed the French Revolution had been a success. “Too soon to say,” he replied.

It does seem to me, however, that the rise of the United States 100 years ago and the rise of China today have a lot in common. Accommodating China to the world and the world to China will take time, patience, and good will on all sides.

The background to the US “opening to China” was the Sino-Soviet split that had been developing for at least two decades as well as the gradual convergence of Chinese and American strategic interests. The geo-political landscape was changing during the late 1960s and early 1970s and provided possibilities for accommodation between China and the U.S. But the successful conclusion of the negotiations that led to the Shanghai Communiqué on 28 February 1972 was also the result of an extraordinary encounter between two men of very different backgrounds, Zhou En-lai and Henry Kissinger. It was as if Kongming met Bismarck. In the end, they reached an historic agreement. I think we can see now that this agreement appears more important as time goes by. It is important because it remains the basis of the China-US relationship. As an historian, I also see the agreement as the beginning of the end of the Cold War.

So what lessons can we draw from this experience for today? I think there is a key lesson and it comes from Henry Kissinger himself. If you read again that chapter in Diplomacy that covers the negotiations between China and the US, Kissinger makes, I think, a fundamental point. He says agreement on the Shanghai Communiqué was achieved because the two countries treated each other as equals and the leaders treated each other with respect. Kissinger’s conclusion of that time provides a good lesson for today, not only for the US but for China. I am happy to see a gradual but important change taking place in Chinese policy towards Taiwan. I am going to be very careful here. I don’t want to offend anyone. But I think the new formula is important. It describes Taiwan as an equal. According to this view, Taiwan and the People’s Republic form two equal parts of historic China. The implication of this formulation is that negotiations between Taiwan and the Mainland must be carried out between equals and with mutual respect in order to work toward eventual unification. That of course is the formula originally put forth by the former mayor of Shanghai, Wang Dăuhàng, and I think it is a wise one. And I wonder whether it too draws on the experience of the Shanghai Communiqué. In any case, I applaud China for moving in this direction.

Let me now draw some conclusions from these remarks and try to answer my own question – why history matters? History matters because it provides us with the best framework for studying international affairs; without history, we are politically illiterate. History cannot tell us what to do about a particular international problem, but it can provide us with the background and context for the decisions we need to make. History teaches us that the world has always been a complicated place and that we need to be respectful of each others’ hopes, fears, and expectations.

Earlier I quoted three important statesmen: Talleyrand, Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger. I would like to end by quoting the great Chinese philosopher, Kŏng Fū Zĭ, Confucius. This comes from an exchange in the Lún Yŭ, the Analects in English, between Confucius and one of his early students, Zī Gòng. Significantly, Zī Gòng was a successful diplomat and merchant, with some political ambitions. He asks Confucius, about the elements of good government?” Confucius answers, “Food, arms and trust (Xìn).” Zī Gòng then says, “If you have to remove one of those, which would you remove first?” Confucius answers, “Arms.” Zī Gòng then asks, “If you have to remove a second, which would it be?” “Give up food,” Confucius responds. “Death has always been with us since the beginning of time, but when there is no trust, the people will have nothing to stand on.”

Now I think we can apply this principle of Confucius to global governance in the contemporary world. The most important factors in good global governance are economic growth, international security, and trust – Xìn. If you have to remove one, the first to go should be arms. If you have to remove a second, it must be food. Trust remains the most important factor; without trust, there can be no basis for international understanding and peace. Trust is the hardest thing to build up and the easiest thing to lose.

This leads me to a final observation. One of the valuable lessons we can learn from Confucius is that the study of politics, including international politics, must involve morality as well as power. Politics is not just about acquiring and holding on to power; it is how we use power, and to what ends we use power, and the example we set for others.

Sometimes I think we don’t spend enough time on morality when we study international affairs. Only rarely do we do so at SAIS Washington. Perhaps this is because we are embarrassed by the subject. When we try to discuss morality in foreign policy, we usually do so indirectly and with some awkwardness. But as Confucius teaches us, morality is a serious subject that should be studied intensively. In this respect, Confucius was both an idealist and a realist. He combined the two schools we tend to separate in the West. I am pleased that at SAIAS Shanghai there is a greater attention to the study of morality along with power in your courses on international affairs. In large part I am sure this is because of the influence of your excellent Dean, but I also imagine this reflects the continuing influence of Confucius in Chinese political thinking. Once again, we have much to learn from each other and our respective historical experiences and traditions.

[1] For stimulating accounts of this debate, see John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization (Cambridge University, 2004) and Martin Bernal, Black Athena (Rutgers University, 1987).H

[2] The classic treatment of this European historical pattern is Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Balance (Vintage, 1962).

[3] See, for example, David P. Calleo, Rethinking Europe’s Future (Princeton University, 2003), especially the Afterward.

[4] For a compelling assessment of global trends based on consultations with non-government experts from around the world, see U.S. National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future (Government Printing Office, 2004). The message of the study is that the U.S. will face increasing problems as a unipolar power, because the world is becoming more complex and pluralist.

[5] Xiang Lanxin provides a balanced critique of both U.S. and China policies in “Why Washington Can’t Speak Chinese,” Washington Post (April 16, 2006).